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The Supreme Court has candidly admitted that the "debate within the Court
about the exclusionary rule has always been a warm one" and "the evolution of the
exclusionary rule has been marked by sharp divisions in the Court."' The
exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment, clearly adopted in 1914
for federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United States,2 was not applied to the states
until 1961. Although the rule in Weeks and many years thereafter was considered
constitutionally mandated, the Court deconstitutionalized it in 1974. Since then,
the Court has consistently maintained that the exclusionary sanction is not 'a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved' and it "is neither intended nor
able to 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already
suffered.' 3  The exclusionary rule, according to the Court's current view, is a
judicially created remedy designed to deter future police misconduct and,
apparently, targets only conduct that the Court views as sufficiently culpable.
Deterrence is now the rule's sole purpose, despite decades of Supreme Court
declarations that that purpose has never been empirically proven and despite much
skepticism about whether the rule does in fact deter.
I am a proponent of the view that the rule is constitutionally based and is an
individual remedy for the violation of that person's Fourth Amendment rights.
Both sides of the exclusionary rule debate regarding whether it is a mere tool to
enforce deterrence or whether it is an individual right-based remedy have weighty
authority and supporters. In my view, the constitutionally-based argument is
persuasive: in constitutional law, there can be no right without a remedy.
Subsidiary arguments reinforce that view. Those include the absence of any
rational or empirical justification for the rule if based on deterrence theory, the lack
of authority of the Court to apply the rule to the states absent a constitutional basis,
and the coherence of the justification for exceptions to the rule's application if
constitutionally based, unlike the ad hoc deterrence rationale, which is a mere
substitute for each justice's subjective assessment as to whether to apply the
sanction.
. John T. Copenhaver Jr. Chair of Law, West Virginia University College of Law, visiting
endowed chair for the 2012-13 academic year. Director, National Center for Justice and the Rule of
Law, and Research Professor, University of Mississippi School of Law. I thank Kimberly Thompson
for her outstanding help as my research assistant.
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
2 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (citations omitted).
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In this essay, I make several additional points. First, there are no articulate
proponents on the current Court who embrace Weeks's view that the rule is
constitutionally based. Also, the evolution of the basis of the rule in the states is
particularly convoluted, based on the influence of Supreme Court developments
over the decades. However, in reaction to the high Court's rejection of a
constitutional basis for the rule in recent decades, there have developed some
spokespersons for the Weeks rationale-albeit on independent state constitutional
grounds. Finally, although we are reaching the nadir in the current United States
Supreme Court regarding the justification for-and application of-the
exclusionary rule, it may simply be another moment in time.
1. THE ORIGINAL CONCEPTION OF THE RULE AS A PERSONAL RIGHT
In 1914, Justice Day wrote the unanimous opinion for the Court in Weeks v.
United States,4 which adopted the exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions. That
was an era of muscular individual rights, including rights afforded by the Fourth
Amendment,6 and the Weeks Court enforced those rights with an equally strong
4 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), is arguably the source of the rule. Decided in
1886 in the context of a forfeiture proceeding, the Boyd Court determined that an invoice had been
illegally obtained by the government. Id. at 638. The Court held that the inspection of the invoice by
the district attorney and its admission into evidence by the trial court "were erroneous and
unconstitutional proceedings." Id. Boyd was premised in part on a relationship of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendment that has since been rejected. E.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463, 471-73 (1976). Nonetheless, the Court appeared to view the remedy of denial of the
document's use to be constitutionally based. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551 n.9
(1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that the origins of the exclusionary rule extend to Boyd).
Still, although the Boyd Court spoke at length about the nature of the constitutional violations, its
discussion of the grounding of the remedy was cryptic.
In Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), Justice Day wrote a complex and confusing
opinion for an unanimous Court, which is sometimes cited for the proposition that Adams rejected the
application of the Fourth Amendment (and any exclusionary rule) to the states. In actuality, the
Court in Adams did "not feel called upon to discuss the contention that the 14th Amendment [had]
made the provisions of the 4th and 5th Amendments" applicable to the states. Id. at 594. Instead,
based on examining the record, Day wrote that the Court was convinced that there had been "no
violation of these constitutional restrictions, either in an unreasonable search or seizure, or in
compelling [Adams] . . . to testify against himself." Id. Adams was a prosecution for possession of
gambling paraphernalia used in a game then commonly known as policy and today known as a
lottery. Id. at 586. Justice Day, for the Court, observed that there had been no objection at trial to the
testimony of the police officers regarding the policy slips and that Adams's objection had been to the
introduction of those slips into evidence. Id. at 594. Finding that the policy slips were "clearly
competent" as evidence, the Court maintained that "the weight of authority as well as reason limits
the inquiry to the competency of the proffered testimony, and the courts do not stop to inquire as to
the means by which the evidence was obtained." Id. The Court pointed out that English and "nearly
all" American cases had declined to exclude competent evidence. Id. at 598. Justice Day, in Weeks,
reinterpreted Adams to be about procedure, that is, the claim seeking exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence cannot be raised for the first time during the trial. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393-97.
6 See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,
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remedy. Justice Day asserted:
The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the United States
and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority,
and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of
law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not,
and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all
[e]ntrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to
obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . . should find no
sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times
with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all
conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such
fundamental rights.
In Weeks, private papers, including lottery tickets and letters, were seized
during an illegal search of Weeks's room in a private house.8 Weeks was recently
summarized by the Court as follows:
[T]he abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule featured intentional
conduct that was patently unconstitutional. In Weeks, a foundational
exclusionary rule case, the officers had broken into the defendant's home
(using a key shown to them by a neighbor), confiscated incriminating
papers, then returned again with a U.S. Marshal to confiscate even more.
Not only did they have no search warrant, which the Court held was
required, but they could not have gotten one had they tried. They were
so lacking in sworn and particularized information that "not even an
order of court would have justified such procedure."9
The Weeks Court itself observed:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307, 309-27 (1998); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth
Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48
STAN. L. REv. 555 (1996).
232 U.S. at 391-92.
8 Id. at 388-89.
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009) (citations omitted).
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might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in
their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.' 0
The protections of the Amendment, the Court stated, applied to legislative and
judicial actions and "equally extended" to the actions of federal law enforcement
officers." Thus, to permit law enforcement officers to illegally seize evidence
"would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest "neglect" if not an open
defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution."l 2 The Court in Weeks thereafter
found that it was error not to restore the papers to Weeks and by "holding them and
permitting their use upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was committed." 3
Weeks also determined that the Fourth Amendment applied to the actions of the
federal government and not to state actors.14
In the next case discussing the exclusionary rule, Silverthorne Lumber
Company v. United States, 5 federal officials illegally raided a company's offices
and seized all of its books, records, and papers.' 6 The material records were
photographed or copied.'7  Although the district court ordered the originals
returned to the company, it impounded the photographs and copies." After the
company failed to comply with subpoenas issued for the originals, the district court
found the company in contempt.' 9 Upon review of that order in the Supreme
Court, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, clearly viewed the exclusionary rule
as constitutionally based:
The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that although
of course its seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets,
it may study the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may
use the knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in a more
regular form to produce them; that the protection of the Constitution
covers the physical possession but not any advantages that the
Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the
10 232 U.S. at 393.
"Id. at 394.
12 id
13 Id. at 398.
14 id.
's 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
16 Id at 390.
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forbidden act. Weeks, to be sure, had established that laying the papers
directly before the grand jury was unwarranted, but it is taken to mean
only that two steps are required instead of one. In our opinion such is not
the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words. The
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean
that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If
knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be
proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's
own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.20
This view-that the exclusionary rule was constitutionally based-prevailed,
unchallenged, for many years. 21 Indeed, there was no dissent from that view.
II. UNDERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS-APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO
THE STATES
Then came Wolf v. Colorado.22 In that case, the Court engaged in a radical
reordering of the relationship of the exclusionary rule to the substantive protections
of the Amendment within a due process framework. Wolf was a misconceived
attempt at compromise, seeking to apply essential search and seizure values to
state actors without mandating the exclusionary rule as a remedy. The Court said:
"The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . is ...
implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
states through the Due Process Clause." 23 But the Court held that the exclusionary
rule was not enforceable against the States as "an essential ingredient of the
right." 24
The majority, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, reasoned:
In Weeks v. United States, this Court held that in a federal
prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured
20 Id. at 391-92 (citations omitted).
21 E.g., United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793 (1949) (collecting cases
applying the exclusionary rule); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928) ("The striking
outcome of the Weeks Case and those which followed it was the sweeping declaration that the Fourth
Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the use of evidence in court, really forbade its
introduction, if obtained by government officers through a violation of the amendment."); Dodge v.
United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926) ("If the search and seizure are unlawful as invading personal
rights secured by the Constitution those rights would be infringed yet further if the evidence were
allowed to be used.").
22 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
23 Id. at 27-28.
24 Id. at 29.
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through an illegal search and seizure. . . . It was not derived from the
explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment; it was not based on
legislation expressing Congressional policy in the enforcement of the
Constitution. The decision was a matter of judicial implication. Since
then it has been frequently applied and we stoutly adhere to it. But the
immediate question is whether the basic right to protection against
arbitrary intrusion by the police demands the exclusion of logically
relevant evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure
because, in a federal prosecution for a federal crime, it would be
excluded. As a matter of inherent reason, one would suppose this to be
an issue to which men with complete devotion to the protection of the
right of privacy might give different answers. When we find that in fact
most of the English-speaking world does not regard as vital to such
protection the exclusion of evidence thus obtained, we must hesitate to
treat this remedy as an essential ingredient of the right. The contrariety
of views of the States is particularly impressive in view of the careful
reconsideration which they have given the problem in the light of the
Weeks decision.25
The Wolf majority surveyed the views of the states regarding the exclusionary
rule and compiled lists of the states adopting and refusing to adopt the rule.26 The
majority ultimately observed: "Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence
may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court
to condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process
Clause a State's reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced,
would be equally effective."2 7
Wolf was thus a begrudging extension of constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizures to state actors. Justice Frankfurter, the author of
Wolf, was a consistent advocate of a view of due process that saw that right as not
incorporating all of the Fourth Amendment's features. Instead, he sought to find
the essence of "ordered liberty" underlying due process and to identify those
essential features. 2 8 The search and seizure vision protected by due process was, in
many undefined ways, distinct from the legal principles constructed to define the
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. Wolf reflected that view: ordered
liberty prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures but did not mandate
exclusion of evidence by the states. The remedy was thus severed from the right.
Justice Black concurred in Wolf He agreed with what appeared to him to be
the "plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is
not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of
2s Id. at 28-29.
26 Id. at 29-39.
27 Id. at 31.
2 Id. at 27, 40.
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evidence which Congress might negate." 2 9 Black was the first justice to explicitly
so characterize the rule.
Dissenting in Wolf Justice Rutledge, joined by Justice Murphy, agreed that
the Fourth Amendment applied to the states but rejected the Court's failure to
provide the sanction of exclusion. Rutledge believed "that the Amendment
without the sanction is a dead letter." 30 Recalling Justice Holmes's words in
Silverthorne, Rutledge asserted that
the version of the Fourth Amendment today held applicable to the states
hardly rises to the dignity of a form of words; at best it is a pale and
frayed carbon copy of the original, bearing little resemblance to the
Amendment the fulfillment of whose command I had heretofore thought
to be "an indispensable need for a democratic society."30
He also rejected "any intimation that Congress could validly enact legislation
permitting the introduction in federal courts of evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment." 3 2 Rutledge mistakenly concluded: "The view that the Fourth
Amendment itself forbids the introduction of evidence illegally obtained in federal
prosecutions is one of long standing and firmly established. It is too late in my
judgment to question it now."33
Justice Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, also wrote a dissent in Wolf He
believed that there was "but one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no
sanction at all."3 4 Murphy discussed why alternative remedies were an illusion and
asserted:
The conclusion is inescapable that but one remedy exists to deter
violations of the search and seizure clause. That is the rule which
excludes illegally obtained evidence. Only by exclusion can we impress
upon the zealous prosecutor that violation of the Constitution will do him
no good. And only when that point is driven home can the prosecutor be
expected to emphasize the importance of observing constitutional
demands in his instructions to the police.
If proof of the efficacy of the federal rule were needed, there is
testimony in abundance in the recruit training programs and in-service
courses provided the police in states which follow the federal rule.3 s
29 Id. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring).
30 Id. at 47 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
3' Id. at 47-48.
32 Id. at 48.
33 Id. (citations omitted).
34 Id. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 44.
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After detailing some of those training programs, Murphy maintained that "this is
an area in which judicial action" had produced a "positive effect upon the breach
of law; and that without judicial action, there are simply no effective sanctions
presently available."36 The opinions in Wolf began an extended debate about the
basis for the exclusionary rule and those opinions raised most of the arguments that
continue to this day.37
The view that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally based reached the high-
water mark of the post-Wolf era in Mapp v. Ohio,38 which overruled Wolf and
applied the exclusionary rule to the states. The Court held that "all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by the same
authority, inadmissible in a state court."39 Justice Clark wrote the opinion for the
majority and viewed the rule as "an essential part of both the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments."4 0 Justice Clark traced the history of the Court's
36 Id. at 46. Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissent, agreeing with Justice Murphy that, "in
the absence of that rule of evidence the Amendment would have no effective sanction." Id. at 40
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
3 In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), a significant rhetorical shift in the rationale
for the exclusionary rule appeared. In that federal prosecution, the Court overruled the "silver
platter" doctrine, which had permitted the use in federal trials of evidence obtained illegally by state
agents. Id. at 208. Applying the exclusionary rule to such prosecutions, the Court viewed its decision
as involving "the Court's supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts." Id. at 216. The "basic postulate of the exclusionary rule," Elkins proclaimed, is that it "is
calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 217.
Although the Court noted that there were no empirical statistics available to demonstrate the
rule's effectiveness and that "it is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be assembled,"
"pragmatic evidence" nonetheless was available:
The federal courts themselves have operated under the exclusionary rule of Weeks for
almost half a century; yet it has not been suggested either that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has thereby been rendered ineffective, or that the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts has thereby been disrupted. Moreover, the experience of the
states is impressive. Not more than half the states continue totally to adhere to the rule
that evidence is freely admissible no matter how it was obtained. Most of the others have
adopted the exclusionary rule in its entirety; the rest have adopted it in part. The
movement towards the rule of exclusion has been halting but seemingly inexorable.
Id. at 218-19 (footnotes omitted). Elkins discussed at some length those trends in the states and the
practical effects of rules the Court announces. It also pointed to "another consideration-the
imperative of judicial integrity," that is, it could not countenance making courts accomplices in the
disobedience of the Constitution by police officers. Id. at 222-23.
3 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 Id. at 655.
40 Id. at 657. The Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 n.21 (1976), maintained that
Justice Clark's opinion did not garner a majority. Powell asserted that "[o]nly four Justices adopted
the view that the Fourth Amendment itself requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized
evidence in state trials" and that Justice Black, the fifth vote, grounded the constitutional basis for
exclusion on a "conjunction" of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. That observation is true but,
in Mapp, Justice Black stated:
I fully agree with Mr. Justice Bradley's opinion [in Boyd] that the two Amendments upon
which the Boyd doctrine rests are of vital importance in our constitutional scheme of
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treatment of the exclusionary rule and observed:
This Court [since Weeks] has ever since required of federal law officers a
strict adherence to that command which this Court has held to be a clear,
specific, and constitutionally required-even if judicially implied-
deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth
Amendment would have been reduced to "a form of words." It meant,
quite simply, that "conviction by means of unlawful seizures and
enforced confessions ... should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts . . . ," and that such evidence "shall not be used at all."
There are in the cases of this Court some passing references to the
Weeks rule as being one of evidence. But the plain and unequivocal
language of Weeks-and its later paraphrase in Wolf-to the effect that
the Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, remains entirely undisturbed.4 1
Justice Clark viewed the application of the exclusionary rule to the states to be
"logically and constitutionally necessary" as "an essential ingredient of the right
newly recognized by the Wolf case.... To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in
reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment."4 2 He stated that the use of other
remedies to enforce the Fourth Amendment had proven to be of "obvious
futility." 43 Clark also spoke of the imperative of judicial integrity: "The criminal
goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
liberty and that both are entitled to a liberal rather than a niggardly interpretation. The
courts of the country are entitled to know with as much certainty as possible what scope
they cover. The Court's opinion, in my judgment, dissipates the doubt and uncertainty in
this field of constitutional law and I am persuaded, for this and other reasons stated, to
depart from my prior views, to accept the Boyd doctrine as controlling in this state case
and to join the Court's judgment and opinion which are in accordance with that
constitutional doctrine.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 666 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). By joining not only the judgment
but also the "opinion," Black at least arguably made Clark's opinion a majority one. For an insightful
analysis of Justices Clark's and Black's negotiations that produced Clark's opinion in Mapp, see
Dennis D. Dorin, Marshaling Mapp: Justice Tom Clark's Role in Mapp v. Ohio's Extension of the
Exclusionary Rule to State Searches and Seizures, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 401 (2001).
Nonetheless, in several subsequent cases, Justice Black reiterated his view that the Fourth
Amendment had no exclusionary rule and that exclusion was warranted only when it worked in
conjunction with the Fifth Amendment. E.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 496-98
(1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 76 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 703-05 (1965) (Black, J.,
concurring). See also Jacob W. Landynski, In Search of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment, 45
FORDHAM L. REv. 453, 478 (1976) (observing that Justice Black "had taken nearly every possible
position on the [exclusionary] rule's derivation").
41' 367 U.S. at 648-49 (citations omitted).
42 Id. at 656.
43 Id. at 652-53.
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disregard of the charter of its own existence.""
Clark also maintained that there was no evidence that the exclusionary rule
"fetters law enforcement." 45 He concluded:
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to
destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the
liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the
States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer
permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable
in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the
Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and
truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice.46
In the years following Mapp, the battle regarding the nature and purpose of
the exclusionary rule continued. In Linkletter v. Walker,47 the Court declined to
make Mapp retroactive because, in large part, the deterrent function of the
exclusionary rule would not be advanced by doing so. Justice Black in dissent
criticized this reasoning:
One reason-perhaps a basic one-put forward by the Court for its
refusal to give Linkletter the benefit of the search and seizure
exclusionary rule is the repeated statement that the purpose of that rule is
to deter sheriffs, policemen, and other law officers from making unlawful
searches and seizures. The inference I gather from these repeated
4 Id. at 659.
45 id.
46 Id. at 660 (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas, while joining the opinion of the Court,
emphasized in his concurring opinion the illegality of the acts in Mapp and the inadequacy of other
remedies. Id. at 670-72. Douglas wrongly predicted that Wolf had evoked "a storm of constitutional
controversy which only today finds its end." Id. at 670. Justice Stewart dissented on other grounds.
Id. at 686. Justice Harlan dissented, in an opinion joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker.
Although he assumed that the exclusionary rule was of constitutional origin, Harlan maintained that it
was a remedy that "is aimed at deterring [official misconduct] in the future." Id. at 678, 680. He
detailed why he would not impose that remedy on the states, including his views that the states
should be given freedom to experiment, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower the Court
to "mould state remedies," and that it was not fundamentally unfair to permit relevant evidence to be
presented in a trial. Id. at 680-85.
47 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965).
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statements is that the rule is not a right or privilege accorded to
defendants charged with crime but is a sort of punishment against
officers in order to keep them from depriving people of their
constitutional rights. In passing I would say that if that is the sole
purpose, reason, object and effect of the rule, the Court's action in
adopting it sounds more like lawmaking than construing the Constitution.
Both the majority and the concurring members of the Boyd Court seemed
to believe they were construing the Constitution. Quite aside from that
aspect, however, the undoubted implication of today's opinion that the
rule is not a safeguard for defendants but is a mere punishing rod to be
applied to law enforcement officers is a rather startling departure from
many past opinions, and even from Mapp itself Mapp quoted from the
Court's earlier opinion in Weeks v. United States, certainly not with
disapproval, saying that the Court "in that case clearly stated that use of
the seized evidence involved 'a denial of the constitutional rights of the
accused."' I have read and reread the Mapp opinion but have been
unable to find one word in it to indicate that the exclusionary search and
seizure rule should be limited on the basis that it was intended to do
nothing in the world except to deter officers of the law. If the
exclusionary rule has the high place in our constitutional plan of
"ordered liberty," which this Court in Mapp and other cases has so
frequently said that it does have, what possible valid reason can justify
keeping people in jail under convictions obtained by wanton disregard of
a constitutional protection which the Court itself in Mapp treated as
being one of the "constitutional rights of the accused"? 48
III. THE PRIMACY OF DETERRENCE THEORY
The view that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally based has lost the
debate within the Court. As to the nature of the exclusionary rule, the Court in
United States v. Calandra49 emphatically de-constitutionalized it. That has been
the unwavering position of the Court ever since.50 Indeed, since Calandra, few
justices have grounded the exclusionary rule in the Constitution.' As to the
48 Id. at 648-50 (Black, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
49 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
50 E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984).
5' E.g., Penn. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 370-71 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 19 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Leon, 468 U.S. at 935
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The argument that the rule is constitutionally based persists in the writing
of many commentators. E.g., Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a
"Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983);
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1983).
Akhil Reed Amar, in his article, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757,
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purpose of the rule, the view that the rule is designed to deter future police
misconduct has evolved to be the rule's sole purpose.52 The other articulated
purposes have been relegated to the past.53 Of course, when the rule was seen as
constitutionally required, its overriding purpose was to enforce the Fourth
Amendment's promise of no unreasonable searches and seizures and "the
811-16 (1994), claimed that the exclusionary rule should be abolished as having no legitimate basis
and that a "traditional civil-enforcement model" that includes entity liability, no immunity defenses,
punitive damages, class actions, attorneys fees, and injunctive relief, should be substituted.
Numerous scholars disagree with his views, including his historical analysis and the roles of
exclusion and civil actions. E.g., Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707 (1996); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and
Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again", 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (1996);
Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 820
(1994). See also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing
inadequacy of other remedies); Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2001) (collecting authorities and stating: "There is general agreement on the
ineffectiveness of tort actions under current law. The reasons most commonly cited are inadequate
damages, immunity defenses, individual liability, juror prejudice, and lack of representation."). For
other scholarly comment in favor of eliminating the rule, see Christopher Slobogin, The Liberal
Assault on the Fourth Amendment, 4 OHIO Sr. J. CRuM. L. 603 (2007); Christopher Slobogin, Why
Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 363 (1999).
52 E.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 613 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (the "critical"
rationale underlying whether the exclusionary rule applies is whether it would "deter future errors");
Penn. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
53 The Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), effectively established deterrence
as the sole basis for the rule. Although the Court modestly stated that deterrence of future unlawful
police conduct was the "'prime purpose' of the rule, if not the sole one," id. at 446, it then proceeded
to eliminate judicial integrity as the other remaining justification by subsuming it into deterrence
theory:
The primary meaning of "judicial integrity" in the context of evidentiary rules is that the
courts must not commit or encourage violations of the Constitution. In the Fourth
Amendment area, however, the evidence is unquestionably accurate, and the violation is
complete by the time the evidence is presented to the court. The focus therefore must be
on the question whether the admission of the evidence encourages violations of Fourth
Amendment rights .... [T]his inquiry is essentially the same as the inquiry into whether
exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose. The analysis showing that exclusion in this
case has no demonstrated deterrent effect and is unlikely to have any significant such
effect shows, by the same reasoning, that the admission of the evidence is unlikely to
encourage violations of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 458 n.35 (citations omitted). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976) ("While
courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this
concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence."); United
States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537 (1975) ("The teaching of these retroactivity cases is that if the law
enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they had seized was admissible
at trial, the 'imperative of judicial integrity' is not offended by the introduction into evidence of that
material even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure have broadened the exclusionary rule to
encompass evidence seized in that manner."); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 260 n.14 (1983)
(White, J., concurring) ("I am content that the interests in judicial integrity run along with rather than
counter to the deterrence concept, and that to focus upon the latter is to promote, not denigrate, the
former.").
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implementation of this constitutionally mandated sanction merely place[d] the
government in the same position as if it had not conducted the illegal search and
seizure in the first place."54 That purpose disappeared with the de-
constitutionalization of the rule.
In determining whether to apply the rule, the Calandra Court maintained that
"the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served," with a "balancing process
implicit in this approach."55 Yet, even as it elevated the importance of deterrence,
the Court in United States v. Janis5 6 discounted its efficacy, asserting, "unhappily"
that there was no "convincing empirical evidence" of the rule's deterrent effects.57
The Court cited abundant scholarship attempting to measure deterrence but
believed that, for a variety of reasons, "each empirical study on the subject, in its
own way, appears to be flawed."58  It asserted that no effective quantitative
measure of the rule's deterrent efficacy had been devised. Collecting various
authorities, the Court believed they fell "'short of an empirical substantiation or
refutation of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.'" 59 The Janis majority
stated that "[t]he final conclusion is clear. No empirical researcher, proponent or
54 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 19 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 553 n.11 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the test for application of
the exclusionary rule was whether the Fourth Amendment had been violated, "nothing more and
nothing less"); Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante,
33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 261 (1998) (arguing that the main purpose of the exclusionary rule should
be to restore the status quo ante and that that restorative justification provides a principled basis for
judicial decision making).
" 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). The dissent was written by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Douglas and Marshall. Tracing prior case law, Brennan rejected any central role for deterrence and
clung to the view that the rule was an essential part of the Fourth Amendment. He observed: "The
exclusionary rule is needed to make the Fourth Amendment something real; a guarantee that does not
carry with it the exclusion of evidence obtained by its violation is a chimera." Id. at 361 (Brennan, J.
dissenting).
428 U.S. 433 (1976).
Id. at 446.
58 Id. at 449-50 (footnote omitted).
5 Id. at 453 n.22 (quoting Dallin Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 709 (1970)). The Janis majority "conclude[d] that exclusion from
federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer has
not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it
outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion." Id. at 454. Believing that it had to employ
"common sense" in the "absence of convincing empirical data," the majority found that the deterrent
effect is "highly attenuated when the 'punishment' imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement
officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or against a different sovereign." Id. at
457-58. Extending the exclusionary rule in such circumstances "would be an unjustifiably drastic
action by the courts in the pursuit of what is an undesired and undesirable supervisory role over
police officers." Id. at 458. The majority added: "There comes a point at which courts, consistent
with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the
pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches. We
find ourselves at that point in this case." Id. at 459.
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opponent of the rule, has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the
rule has a deterrent effect even in the situations in which it is now applied."6 o
From Calandra, through the most recent decisions, the Court relentlessly
applies what is called an empirically 6 1 based balancing test, which weighs the
efficacy of deterrence of future governmental misbehavior against the costs of
exclusion. 62  This is despite repeatedly-stated doubts about the existence of
deterrence and the Court's view that there has been no convincing studies on the
matter.63 According to the Court, exclusion of evidence "exacts a costly toll upon
6 Id. For similar doubts about the effectiveness of the deterrence function of the rule see, for
example, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19 (1984); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 268-71 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490-91
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
6' The Court has sometimes stated that it would reconsider its refusal to extend the rule to
some situations "if future empirical evidence" undermined the assumptions upon which the decision
was based. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 353 n.8 (1987). See also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The debate over the efficacy of an exclusionary rule reveals that
deterrence is an empirical question, not a logical one."). Cf Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("any empirical judgment about the effect of the exclusionary rule in a particular class of
cases necessarily is a provisional one"). Cf id at 942-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Although the
Court's language . .. suggests that some specific empirical basis may support its analyses, the reality
is that the Court's opinions represent inherently unstable compounds of intuition, hunches, and
occasional pieces of partial and often inconclusive data.. . . By remaining within its redoubt of
empiricism and by basing the rule solely on the deterrence rationale, the Court has robbed the rule of
legitimacy. A doctrine that is explained as if it were an empirical proposition but for which there is
only limited empirical support is both inherently unstable and an easy mark for critics.").
62 Krull, 480 U.S. at 347; E.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07; See also Jerry E. Norton, The
Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 261,
270-80 (1998) (tracing the Supreme Court cases relying on deterrence theory).
63 E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976) ("Despite the absence of supportive
empirical evidence, we have assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be to discourage law
enforcement officials from violating the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard
it. More importantly, over the long term, this demonstration that our society attaches serious
consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought to encourage those who formulate law
enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals
into their value system."); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 135, 137 (1954) (plurality opinion)
(questioning efficacy of exclusion on deterrence grounds). Cf Leon, 468 U.S. at 929 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting):
[T]he language of deterrence and of cost/benefit analysis, if used indiscriminately, can
have a narcotic effect. It creates an illusion of technical precision and ineluctability. It
suggests that not only constitutional principle but also empirical data support the
majority's result. When the Court's analysis is examined carefully, however, it is clear
that we have not been treated to an honest assessment of the merits of the exclusionary
rule, but have instead been drawn into a curious world where the "costs" of excluding
illegally obtained evidence loom to exaggerated heights and where the "benefits" of such
exclusion are made to disappear with a mere wave of the hand.
Many commentators, even assuming that a balancing test is appropriate, question the Court's choices
of what to balance and the methodology by which it performs that balancing. E.g., Yale Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical
Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 627-64 (1983). Indeed, some take issue with the label
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the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case"6" and permits "some
guilty defendants [to] go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable
plea bargains." 65 Thus, the Court has restricted application of the exclusionary rule
to instances where its "remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served." 6 6 As a consequence, the Court has developed numerous situations where
the exclusionary rule simply does not apply.67 Deterrence theory also has been
used to limit the type of actors to whom the exclusionary rule applies, leaving the
police as the sole actors subject to the rule.
Deterrence theory leaves the rule without a constitutional grounding. Under
Mapp, the rule was constitutionally required and the Court had clear authority to
insist that the states exclude evidence recovered in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Under Calandra and its progeny, the rule is not constitutionally
required. It is, instead, a "prudential [rule] rather than constitutionally
mandated."6 Thus, although deterrence theory would permit the Court to impose
the rule on federal courts-presumably based on its supervisory powers, the
Court has no such authority over state courts.70 Wolf and not Mapp should be the
operative precedent.
"deterrence" as being "quite misleading." Id. at 597 n.204. As Professor Kamisar has observed:
"Deterrence" suggests that the exclusionary rule is supposed to influence the police the
way the criminal law is supposed to affect the general public. But the rule does not, and
cannot be expected to, "deter" the police the way the criminal law is supposed to work.
The rule does not inflict a "punishment" on police who violate the fourth amendment;
exclusion of the evidence does not leave the police in a worse position than if they had
never violated the Constitution in the first place. Because the police are members of a
structural governmental entity, however, the rule influences them, or is supposed to
influence them, by "systemic deterrence," i.e., through a department's institutional
compliance with fourth amendment standards.
It may be preferable to abolish "deterrence" terminology altogether, despite its
popularity. It seems more accurate and more useful to call the rule a "disincentive"--a
means of eliminating significant incentives for making illegal searches, at least where the
police contemplate prosecution and conviction.
Id. See also id. at 658-64.
6 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980).
65 Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
66 Id. at 908 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
67 See generally THOMAs K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITs HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION 609-26 (2008).
68 Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998).
69 For Supreme Court cases that view the rule as enforcing the Court's supervisory powers
over the admission of evidence in federal courts, see, for example, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 216 (1960), and Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1954) (plurality opinion). Cf Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (assuming that the rule must be of
Constitutional dimensions because the Supreme Court had no "general supervisory power over the
state courts").
70 Cf Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438-39 (2000) (finding that Miranda
warnings are grounded in a "constitutional rule" in part because the warnings had been imposed on
state courts and the Court would not have otherwise had the authority to do so).
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More recently, new modes of attack on the rule have developed. Justice
Scalia, for the Court in Hudson v. Michigan,7 made a frontal assault:
Suppression of evidence ... has always been our last resort, not our
first impulse. The exclusionary rule generates "substantial social costs,"
which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at
large. We have therefore been "cautio[us] against expanding" it, and
"have repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-
seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for
those urging [its] application[.]" We have rejected "[i]ndiscriminate
application" of the rule, and have held it to be applicable only "where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served," that is,
"where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs[.]"'
We did not always speak so guardedly. Expansive dicta in Mapp,
for example, suggested wide scope for the exclusionary rule .... But we
have long since rejected that approach.72
Hudson, which created a per se rule of inapplicability of the exclusionary rule
to violations of the knock and announce requirement for warrant executions, called
into question the future of the exclusionary rule, pointing to, inter alia, the increase
in police professionalism, 73 and adding: "We cannot assume that exclusion in this
context is necessary deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary
deterrence in different contexts and long ago. That would be forcing the public
today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost half
a century ago."74 Remove a few words from the first sentence of this quotation
and the rationale for abolition of the rule is clear: "We cannot assume that
exclusion ... is necessary deterrence simply because we found that it was
necessary deterrence . .. long ago."75 Abolition was Scalia's clear aim; he planted
the seeds in Hudson and needed one more vote to reap the harvest.76
n 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
72 Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
7 But see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.6 (4th ed. 2004) (2011 update)
("The [Hudson] majority's claim that increased police professionalism and self-discipline have
changed things overlooks the fact that such changes have come about largely because of the
exclusionary rule.").
74 547 U.S. at 597.
75Id.
76 Justice Kennedy was the crucial fifth vote in Hudson. He wrote a concurring opinion in
which he stated that the Hudson "decision determines only that in the specific context of the knock-
and-announce requirement, a violation is not sufficiently related to the later discovery of evidence to
justify suppression." Id. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Kennedy added that "the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and
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Justice Breyer's dissent in Hudson challenged much of the majority's
reasoning but did so by defending the rule as necessary deterrence. Breyer also
saw no reason to believe that the remedies that the Court found inadequate in
Mapp would adequately deter unconstitutional police behavior for knock and
announce violations.77  He viewed "the need for deterrence-the critical factor
driving this Court's Fourth Amendment cases for close to a century," as requiring
exclusion in Hudson.8 Breyer asserted:
There may be instances in the law where text or history or tradition
leaves room for a judicial decision that rests upon little more than an
unvarnished judicial instinct. But this is not one of them. Rather, our
Fourth Amendment traditions place high value upon protecting privacy
in the home. They emphasize the need to assure that its constitutional
protections are effective, lest the Amendment "sound the word of
promise to the ear but break it to the hope." They include an
exclusionary principle, which since Weeks has formed the centerpiece of
the criminal law's effort to ensure the practical reality of those promises.
That is why the Court should assure itself that any departure from that
principle is firmly grounded in logic, in history, in precedent, and in
empirical fact. It has not done so.
Perhaps Breyer's dissent is noble or, perhaps, mere noble sentiment.
Arguably, there appear in his dissent hints of a broader justification for the rule,
that is, that the rule is constitutionally mandated. But Breyer failed to make that
argument. Absent such a ground, Breyer's discussion is little more than wishful
thinking and he, like the majority, continued the evidence-free debate over the
efficacy of deterrence.
This brings us to United States v. Herring,s0 which achieves most of the goals
intimated in Hudson by employing a flanking action: narrowing the rule to only
situations where the police have engaged in demonstrably outrageous conduct.
Herring could be read narrowly 82 or broadly.83 The broader reading, which 184 and
a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression." Id. at 603.
n7 Id. at 609-10 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 610.
7 Id. at 629-30.
s 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
8 Id. at 142-44.
82 E.g., State v. Handy, 18 A.3d 179, 180-81, 186 (N.J. 2011) (rejecting the broader
implications of Herring and applying the exclusionary rule when the arrest was based on incorrect
information regarding the existence of a ten year old outstanding warrant, conveyed by a police
dispatcher to the officer who had stopped Handy for riding his bicycle on the sidewalk in violation of
a city ordinance; the warrant did not match the spelling of Handy's name and bore a different date of
birth); People v. Estrada, 914 N.E.2d 679, 684 (lll. App. 1 Dist. 2009) (Suppressing evidence
resulting from an investigatory stop and stating: "Unlike the officers in Herring, the officer in the
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others85 have argued is the Court's true goal, signals a dramatic restriction in the
application of the exclusionary rule and fundamentally changes the litigation of
motions to suppress in criminal cases. That is, a central question under Herring is
whether the officer had a culpable mental state; if not, the rule does not apply. If
that mode of analysis prevails, it will reduce appreciably the number of cases
addressing the merits of Fourth Amendment claims and expand dramatically the
inapplicability of the exclusionary rule. A court could simply skip the merits of a
claim and address solely the lack of an exclusionary remedy. Thus, a court could
simply rule: although the police officer may have violated the Fourth Amendment,
that issue need not be addressed because any such violation was merely a result of
negligence.
Narrowly, the issue in Herring was whether the good faith doctrine should be
applied when police officers in one jurisdiction checked with employees of the
sheriff's office in another jurisdiction and were told that there was an outstanding
warrant for Herring, who was then arrested.86 Contraband was discovered during
the search incident to Herring's arrest. The report was in error and the warrant
should have been removed from the records but had not been due to the negligence
of personnel in the reporting jurisdiction's sheriffs office.87
Writing for a majority of five, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the
exclusionary rule did not apply. A narrow reading of Herring can be drawn from
the following statement of the holding by the majority: "Here the error was the
result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest. We hold that in these
circumstances the jury should not be barred from considering all the evidence."88
Words of limitation jump out from these sentences: "isolated negligence;"
present case was not acting in reliance on wrong information. Instead, he was operating on his own
suspicion or hunch.").
83 E.g., United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 66-68 (2d Cir. 2010); People v. Robins, 224 P.3d
55, 68 (Cal. 2010).
8 Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 191, 203-07 (2010).
85 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court's
Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 759-60 (2009); Tracey
Maclin & Jennifer Rader, No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court uses an Axe to take out the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 Miss. L.J. 1183 (2011); James J. Tomkovicz, Davis v.
United States: The Exclusion Revolution Continues, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRuM. L. 381, 390-91 (2011). See
also Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence,
111 COLUM. L. REv. 670, 686-88 (2011) (proposing "that Herring may be better understood in the
context of the largely unexamined influence that constitutional tort doctrine has had in shaping
exclusionary rule jurisprudence"). But see Craig M. Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 J.
CRuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 101 (2012) (maintaining that, in light of recent cases, "the exclusionary
rule, though limited, is neither dead nor unacceptably constrained").
8 555 U.S. at 136-37.
87 Id. at 137-38.
88 Id at 137.
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attenuation.89
In contrast, the rest of the majority opinion was very broadly written and
significantly recast modem exclusionary rule theory. Instead of viewing the issue
as part of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, Roberts seemed to
dismiss that notion; instead, he viewed United States v. Leon,90 the genesis of that
exception, as follows: "When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of
probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted 'in
objectively reasonable reliance' on the subsequently invalidated search warrant.
We (perhaps confusingly) called this objectively reasonable reliance 'good
faith."' 91 Creatively refraining exclusionary rule analysis, Roberts asserted that
suppression "turns on the culpability of the police and the potential of exclusion to
deter wrongful police conduct." 92  He later repeated: "The extent to which the
exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence principles varies with the
culpability of the law enforcement conduct."9 He added: "Judge Friendly wrote
that '[t]he beneficent aim of the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct can
be sufficiently accomplished by a practice . . . outlawing evidence obtained by
flagrant or deliberate violation of rights."94
Exclusion appears justified after Herring based on culpability. 95  Thus,
89 Consistent with a narrow view, Roberts later asserted: "An error that arises from
nonrecurring and attenuated negligence is thus far removed from the core concerns that led us to
adopt the rule in the first place." Id. at 144. In Hudson, the majority viewed the knock and announce
violation as attenuated from the recovery of the evidence in the house. 547 U.S. at 586. It stated:
"Attenuation . . . occurs when, even given a direct causal connection, the interest protected by the
constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence
obtained." Id. at 593. The concept of attenuation in Hudson and in Herring differs markedly from the
concept of attenuation that prevailed in pre-Hudson Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Thomas K.
Clancy, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITs HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION §§ 13.3.1.2., 13.3.6. (2008).
9' 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
' 555 U.S. at 142. The label "good faith" is misleading to the extent that it suggests that the
actual belief of the officer is examined. Instead, the inquiry focuses "expressly and exclusively on
the objective reasonableness of an officer's conduct, not on his or her subjective 'good faith' (or 'bad
faith')." People v. Machupa, 872 P.2d 114, 115 n.1 (Cal. 1994). See also Leon, 468 U.S. at 918
(stating that the Court has "frequently questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any
deterrent effect when the offending officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their
conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment"). However, labeling the officer's conduct as
"objectively reasonable" has also been criticized as misleading. See, e.g., id. at 975 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]hen probable cause is lacking, then by definition a reasonable person under the
circumstances would not believe there is a fair likelihood that a search will produce evidence of a
crime. Under such circumstances well-trained professionals must know that they are violating the
Constitution.").
92 555 U.S. at 137.
Id. at 143.
94 Id. (quoting Judge Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,
53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 953 (1965)) (footnotes omitted) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-
11 (1975)) (Powell, J., concurring in part) ("[T]he deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is most
likely to be effective" when "official conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth Amendment rights")).
9s Cf Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith
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Roberts recounted several cases of "intentional" and "flagrant" misconduct,
including in Weeks, that would support exclusion. Roberts flatly asserted:
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice
system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case
does not rise to that level.
The Chief Justice emphasized that negligence is simply not worth the costs of
exclusion.97  "Mere negligence" would make many-if not most-Fourth
Amendment violations inappropriate candidates for suppression. Roberts ended
the majority opinion by quoting one of the more famous statements in opposition
to the adoption of the exclusionary rule and added: "[W]e conclude that when
police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather than
systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal
deterrence does not 'pay its way.' In such a case, the criminal should not 'go free
because the constable has blundered."' 98
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer dissented.99
Justice Ginsburg certainly did not view the Herring decision as narrow.100 She
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 Miss. L.J. 483 (2006) (wide-ranging discussion of role of
culpability in exclusionary rule analysis).
96 555 U.S. at 144. Roberts maintained that recordkeeping errors by the police are not
immune from the exclusionary rule but "the conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to
require exclusion." Id. at 146. He noted: "If the police have been shown to be reckless in
maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for
future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct
cause a Fourth Amendment violation." Id.
9 Id. at 144 n.4. Despite all of the Court's references to apparently subjective states of mind,
Roberts added a confusing twist: all of these inquiries are objective ones. He emphasized that "the
pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective, not an 'inquiry into the subjective
awareness of arresting officers[.].' Id. at 145. Factors in making that determination include a
"particular officer's knowledge and experience, but that does not make the test any more subjective
than the one for probable cause, which looks to an officer's knowledge and experience, but not his
subjective intent[.]" Id.
9 555 U.S. at 147-48 (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (opinion of
the Court by Cardozo, J.)).
9 Justice Breyer, in a separate dissent joined by Justice Souter, believed that negligent record
keeping errors were susceptible to deterrence through application of the exclusionary rule. 555 U.S.
at 157-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
a As she noted, the Court had cited a view of the exclusionary rule "famously held by
renowned jurists Henry J. Friendly and Benjamin Nathan Cardozo." 555. U.S. at 151. Anyone
familiar with the history of the exclusionary rule debate knows that those two jurists are frequently
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replied with a defense of the rule that is notable for the fact that, for the first time
in decades, a member of the Court suggested that the exclusionary rule is based on
some notion broader than deterrence. But her assertions were at best opaque and
she failed to clearly ground her views. She wrote:
Others have described "a more majestic conception" of the Fourth
Amendment and its adjunct, the exclusionary rule. Protective of the
fundamental "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects," the Amendment "is a constraint on the power of the
sovereign, not merely on some of its agents." I share that vision of the
Amendment.
The exclusionary rule is "a remedy necessary to ensure that" the
Fourth Amendment's prohibitions "are observed in fact." The rule's
service as an essential auxiliary to the Amendment earlier inclined the
Court to hold the two inseparable.
Beyond doubt, a main objective of the rule "is to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." But the rule also
serves other important purposes: It "enabl[es] the judiciary to avoid the
taint of partnership in official lawlessness," and it "assur[es] the
people-all potential victims of unlawful government conduct-that the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing
the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government."' 0
After stating this, Justice Ginsburg without further explanation ended that
section of her dissent and then argued in the next section that deterrence theory
supported exclusion in Herring. If Ginsburg truly believed in a "more majestic
conception" of the rule, she did not apply that concept in Herring unless that
conception was merely about deterrence. She gave us no vision and no guides.
relied on by opponents of the rule. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1960):
Most of what has been said in opposition to the rule was distilled in a single Cardozo
sentence-"The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." People v.
Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 [(1926)]. The same point was made at
somewhat greater length in the often quoted words of Professor Wigmore: "Titus, you
have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius, you have confessedly violated
the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for contempt.
But no! We shall let you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall do
so by reversing Titus' conviction. This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to
behave, and of teaching people like Titus to behave, and incidentally of securing respect
for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man
who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else."
Cf United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) ("Our cases have consistently recognized that
unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury. After all, it is the defendant, and
not the constable, who stands trial.").
101 555 U.S. at 151-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Her dissent was the beginning of some partially articulated thought. Rather than
supporting her "more majestic conception" with citations to such foundational
opinions as Weeks, Silverthorne, or Mapp, Ginsburg relied primarily on a few
dissents and a couple of law journal articles. This allowed Chief Justice Roberts
for the majority to observe: "Majestic or not, our cases reject this conception and
perhaps for this reason, [Justice Ginsburg's] dissent relies exclusively on previous
dissents to support its analysis."1 02
Davis v. United States0 3 builds on Herring and reinforces the view that
Herring's analysis will have broad applicability.'0 The consequences of the
severance of the Fourth Amendment right from the remedy are starkly illustrated
by Davis. All of the justices acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment had been
violated by the search of Davis's vehicle. But because the majority viewed
application of the exclusionary rule as a separate question, it left "Davis with a
right but not a remedy." 0 5
Justice Alito wrote for a majority of six. Viewing the exclusionary rule as a
"bitter pill," 06 a "windfall,"o107 a "deterrent sanction," 08 and a "prudential
doctrine,"109 which has the "sole purpose""o of deterring future Fourth
Amendment violations by law enforcement, Alito specifically rejected the original
vision of the rule as "a self-executing mandate implicit in the Fourth
Amendment""' in favor of the view that it is a judicially created remedy. As a
result, he observed, the Court's cases eventually "imposed a more rigorous
weighing of its costs and deterrence benefits,"ll 2 with a later recalibration of that
analysis to "focus the inquiry on the 'flagrancy of the police misconduct' at
issue."l 3 Alito, relying heavily on Herring, continued: "The basic insight of the
Leon line of cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion 'var[y] with the
culpability of the law enforcement conduct' at issue."ll 4
102 Id. at 141 n.2 (citation omitted).
103 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
"04 Davis created a new good faith exception to exclusion: "we hold that searches conducted in
objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary
rule." Id. at 2423-24. It applied that rule to searches incident to arrest involving motor vehicles,
concluding that the police reasonably relied on prior precedent that permitted such searches. Id. at
2429.
105 Id. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 2427.
107 Id. at 2433.
'os Id. at 2423.
'9 Id. at 2426.
110 Id.
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Alito catalogued the Court's good faith cases and then applied the analysis to
the facts in Davis. He observed: "all agree that the officers' conduct was in strict
compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any way."'"5 He
concluded: "Under our exclusionary-rule precedents, this acknowledged absence
of police culpability dooms Davis's claim. . . . The police acted in strict
compliance with binding precedent, and their behavior was not wrongful. Unless
the exclusionary rule is to become a strict-liability regime, it can have no
application in this case.""
Justice Sotomayor, in her opinion concurring in the judgment of the Court,
asserted that the "primary purpose""'7 of the exclusionary rule was deterrence but
she did not identify any other purpose. Although Sotomayor was "compelled to
conclude" that the exclusionary rule did not apply in Davis, she did not believe that
culpability analysis was dispositive." 8 Instead, she contended:
[A]n officer's culpability is relevant because it may inform the
overarching inquiry whether exclusion would result in appreciable
deterrence. Whatever we have said about culpability, the ultimate
questions have always been, one, whether exclusion would result in
appreciable deterrence and, two, whether the benefits of exclusion
outweigh its costs." 9
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, but he offered little as to
a vision of the exclusionary rule. Citing without explanation Mapp and Weeks,
Breyer merely observed that suppression was the "normal remedy" 2 0 and that, by
giving Davis a right but no remedy, "the Court 'keep[s] the word of promise to our
ear' but 'break[s] it to our hope."'l 2 1 He posed the question: "If the Court means
what it says, what will happen to the exclusionary rule[?]"l 2 2 Critical of the new
culpability approach, Breyer saw it as eliminating the rule in
a very large number of cases, potentially many thousands each year.
And since the exclusionary rule is often the only sanction available for a
Fourth Amendment violation, the Fourth Amendment would no longer
protect ordinary Americans from "unreasonable searches and seizures."
It would become a watered-down Fourth Amendment, offering its
"' Id. at 2428.
"1 Id. at 2428-29.
"1' Id. at 2434 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
"Id. at 2435.
"' Id. at 2435-36 (citations omitted).
120 Id. at 2436 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 2437.
122 Id. at 2438.
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protection against only those searches and seizures that are egregiously
unreasonable.123
The new culpability standard articulated in Herring and Davis has remarkable
similarities to the "shocks the conscience" standard that was briefly employed by
the Court post- Wolf and pre-Mapp in a few cases. In Rochin v. California,12 4 the
Court reversed a conviction for possession of morphine because the police used a
doctor to force an emetic solution through a tube into the stomach of a man to
induce vomiting after he swallowed two capsules of morphine. The Court asserted
that the actions to obtain the incriminating evidence "shock[ed] the conscience"
under the Due Process Clause.125 In Irvine v. California,126 the Court was asked to
apply the shocks the conscience standard to a situation that involved repeated
illegal entries into a home, during which the police placed a microphone in various
locations, including the bedroom, to overhear incriminating statements.12 7 The
plurality stated:
Each of these repeated entries of petitioner's home without a search
warrant or other process was a trespass, and probably a burglary, for
which any unofficial person should be, and probably would be, severely
punished. Science has perfected amplifying and recording devices to
become frightening instruments of surveillance and invasion of privacy,
whether by the policeman, the blackmailer, or the busy-body. That
officers of the law would break and enter a home, secrete such a device,
even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversation of the occupants for
over a month would be almost incredible if it were not admitted. Few
police measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly,
deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle declared
by the Fourth Amendment . ...
Yet, the plurality refused to be shocked, maintaining that Rochin involved a
search of the person and an element of coercion that was missing in Irvine.129
123 Id. at 2440 (citations omitted).
124 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
125 Id. at 172.
126 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
127 Id. at 145. The result in Irvine affirming the convictions was tenuously grounded. Justice
Clark, the deciding vote, concurred only in the judgment, even though he thought Wolfwas wrongly
decided and that due process analysis led to unpredictable results. Id. at 138-39 (Clark, J.,
concurring). For an analysis of Irvine and its influence on Chief Justice Warren's views on the
exclusionary rule, see Morgan Cloud, Rights Without Remedies: The Court That Cried "Wolf", 77
Miss. L.J. 467, 492-503 (2007).
128 347 U.S. at 132.
129 Id. at 133. But see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463-64 (1928) (maintaining
that an intrusion into the home by "stealth" was "equivalent to an entry by force").
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According to the plurality, Rochin was not reversed solely because of the search
and seizure issue but, instead, because of the compelled submission to the stomach
pump.13 0 It distinguished Irvine: "However obnoxious are the facts in the case
before us, they do not involve coercion, violence or brutality to the person, but
rather a trespass to property, plus eavesdropping."' 31
Justice Clark, concurring, made an argument that is equally applicable to the
current Court's views:
Of course, we could sterilize the rule announced in Wolf by adopting a
case-by-case approach to due process in which inchoate notions of
propriety concerning local police conduct guide our decisions. But this
makes for such uncertainty and unpredictability that it would be
impossible to foretell-other than by guess-work-just how brazen the
invasion of the intimate privacies of one's home must be in order to
shock itself into the protective arms of the Constitution. In truth, the
practical result of this ad hoc approach is simply that when five Justices
are sufficiently revolted by local police action a conviction is overturned
and a guilty man may go free. Rochin bears witness to this. We may
thus vindicate the abstract principle of due process, but we do not shape
the conduct of local police one whit; unpredictable reversals on
dissimilar fact situations are not likely to curb the zeal of those police
and prosecutors who may be intent on racking up a high percentage of
successful prosecutions.132
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent (remember he wrote Wol, argued for reversal:
There was lacking here physical violence, even to the restricted extent
employed in Rochin. We have here, however, a more powerful and
offensive control over the Irvines' life than a single, limited physical
trespass. Certainly the conduct of the police here went far beyond a bare
search and seizure. The police devised means to hear every word that
was said in the Irvine household for more than a month. Those affirming
the conviction find that this conduct, in its entirety, is "almost incredible
if it were not admitted." Surely the Court does not propose to announce
a new absolute, namely, that even the most reprehensible means for
securing a conviction will not taint a verdict so long as the body of the
accused was not touched by State officials. Considering the progress that
scientific devices are making in extracting evidence without violence or
bodily harm, satisfaction of due process would depend on the astuteness
and subtlety with which the police engage in offensive practices and
130 347 U.S. at 133.
131 Id.
131 Id. at 138 (Clark, J., concurring).
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drastically invade privacy without authority of law. In words that seem
too prophetic of this case, it has been said that "[d]iscovery and invention
have made it possible for the government, by means far more effective
than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet."133
As in Irvine, the police in United States v. Jonesl34 monitored Jones's vehicle
continuously for over a month by surreptitiously installing a GPS device. The
Court recently determined that those actions constituted a search but did not further
determine whether they were reasonable or whether exclusion would be
appropriate. Assuming that the actions in Jones were illegal, were they sufficiently
culpable to justify exclusion? If the monitoring in Irvine, which lasted over a
month and included what occurred in Irvine bedroom was not shocking, why
should the actions in Jones justify exclusion? As Justice Frankfurter observed in
his Irvine dissent, as have many others, technology has unprecedented and ever
increasing abilities to intrude. When does the illegal use of technology become
sufficiently culpable? I think Justice Clark answers this question; as he points out,
a standardless standard, whether under a shocks the conscience verbiage or a
culpability approach, is no standard. For the reasons stated by Clark, it would not
even deter. In contrast, if what mattered was the violation of the person's Fourth
Amendment rights, then the officer's intent, quantifying his culpability, or
calculating future deterrence would be irrelevant. To state it otherwise, shaping
police behavior may be a by-product of protecting a right but the goal of exclusion
should be to protect the person's right.
Professors Gould and Mastrofski, researchers at George Mason University,
and their students observed officers in a medium-sized police department for three
months.'3 5 They concluded that 34 of the 115 searches that were observed were
unconstitutional but that only two or three were egregious enough to provide
grounds for civil liability. 136  They characterized the violations as "a steady
drumbeat of droplets rather than a torrential deluge."' 37 "One way to read this data
is that the violations they uncovered were largely technical--objectionable not
intrinsically, but only because search-and-seizure doctrine defines them as illegal.
Gould and Mastrofski worry that even a steady drumbeat of droplets can do
damage, over time, to the legitimacy of the police."' 3 8 My concerns are different:
'1 Id. at 145-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
134 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
135 See Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. PoL'Y 315 (2004).
136 Id. at 331-34.
'" Id. at 334.
13 David Alan Sklansky, Is The Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 583
(2008).
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the "steady drumbeat" of violations that will not be subject to exclusion under
Herring and Davis will become more and more accepted-not as technical
violations-but as accepted behavior. Reinforcing that erosion are the qualified
immunity cases, which confusingly blend Fourth Amendment principles with
qualified immunity principles.'39 Along with that change, what will be considered
egregious enough to justify exclusion will also be influenced, resulting in
increasingly diminished respect for the right to be secure over time.
V. TRENDS IN THE STATES
Trends in the states have had some influence on the Court's decision to apply
the exclusionary rule to the states. In Wolf in the era where the rule was seen as
constitutionally mandated in federal prosecutions, the Court compiled lists of states
adopting or rejecting the rule.140 The lists were updated in Elkinsl41 and again in
Mapp.142
Likewise, the trends in the United States Supreme Court have had strong
influence on the states.14 3 In the pre- Wolf era, many of the state decisions adopting
the rule were constitutionally based, that is, grounded on each state's
constitution.'" In the post-Mapp but pre-Calandra era, there was not much
development of independently grounded exclusionary rules, given that the federal
rule was seen as constitutionally mandated. But in the post-Calandra era, after the
Supreme Court deconstitutionalized the rule, and particularly after the adoption of
the good faith exception in United States v Leon,145 there has been increasing
139 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 191, 196-200 (2010). The most recent Supreme Court cases in this area illustrate
that trend. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012) (discussing when probable cause
is so lacking in warrant situations so that an officer cannot reasonably rely on warrant); Ryburn v.
Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987 (2012) (confusing mixture of qualified immunity and exigent circumstances
analysis.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29-39 (1949).
141 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 219-21, 224-32 (1960).
142 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961).
143 E.g., State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (N.J. 1987) (noting the "ebb and flow of
federal search-and-seizure law during" the twentieth century). See generally Symposium:
Independent State Grounds: Should States Depart from the Fourth Amendment in Construing Their
Own Constitutions and, if so, on What Basis Beyond Simple Disagreement with the United States
Supreme Court's Result?, 77 Miss. L.J. 1 (2007).
'" See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63, 467-68 (1928) (collecting cases and
observing that those states that had adopted the exclusionary rule believed that it was "required by
constitutional limitations"); Milton Hirsch, Big Bill Haywood's Revenge: The Original Intent of the
Exclusionary Rule, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 35, 79 (2009) ("The state courts that chose to follow the
Weeks [rule] did so on the grounds that the Fourth Amendment (or its state-court congeners) is a rule
of exclusion[.]"). But see People v. Goldston, 682 N.W.2d 479, 483-89 (Mich. 2004) (characterizing
that court's adoption of the exclusionary rule in 1919 as based on non-constitutional grounds and
asserting that "it is a judicially created rule, not a constitutional rule").
145 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
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litigation seeking to exclude evidence in violation of state search and seizure
provisions.146
The currents of Supreme Court jurisprudence have rippled repeatedly through
the state courts. For example, in Illinois, its Supreme Court adopted an
exclusionary rule in 1924 that was constitutionally grounded, 147 rejected
reconsidering that view in light of Wolf,148 and recently affirmed that view, despite
adhering to a limited lock-step approach for defining substantive search and
seizure rights.14 9  Missouri adopted an exclusionary rule in 1924 that appeared
constitutionally based,150 was viewed as "independent of the federal rule,"'' but
now simply follows federal analysis.152 New Jersey and New Hampshire did not
have independent exclusionary rules prior to Mapp, found no need to adopt one
after Mapp, but adopted such rules based on more recent restrictions imposed by
the high Court on the federal rule. 5 3
Many states continue to follow in lock-step United States Supreme Court
analysis' 54 and some states, which never had a state-based exclusionary rule, still
do not.'55 California, for example, has adopted a provision that requires its courts
not to depart from Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule analysis.'5 6  Professor
Sklansky has noted one significant consequence of that legal framework:
What has happened when evidentiary exclusion is removed as a
remedy for police illegality? ... The most prominent example of such a
restriction is the ban that California constitutional law places on
warrantless searches of trash placed at curbside for collection. That
restriction was rejected, as a matter of federal constitutional law, by the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1984. Since that time, as far as I can tell, police
in California have pretty much completely ignored the warrant
146 See generally Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and Incompletely Theorized State Constitution
Decision-Making, 77 Miss. L.J. 265, 269-313 (2007).
147 People v. Castree, 143 N.E. 112 (Ill. 1924).
148 Chicago v. Lord, 130 N.E.2d 504 (Ill. 1955).
149 People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26 (111. 2006).
Iso State v. Owens, 259 S.W. 100 (Mo. 1924).
1s1 State v. Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140, 145 n.10 (Mo. 1986).
152 Id. at 146.
153 State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 1995); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J.
1987).
114 E.g., Brown, 708 S.W.2d at 145-46. See generally Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State
Search and Seizure Analogs, 77 Miss. L.J. 417 (2007).
15s E.g., State v. Fredette, 411 A.2d 65, 67 (Me. 1979).
156 People v. Camacho, 3 P.3d 878, 882 (Cal. 2000) ("Our state constitution ... forbids the
courts to order the exclusion of evidence at trial as a remedy for an unreasonable search and seizure
unless that remedy is required by the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court.").
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requirement imposed by state constitutional law for garbage searches.
Without the remedy of the exclusionary rule, the rule has evaporated.
In fact, California police officers are now trained to ignore it. Police
academy materials explain that garbage loses most if not all of its
"expectation of privacy" when it is "bagged and placed at the curbside."
The authoritative legal sourcebook distributed to police departments by
the state's Department of Justice dutifully notes that "[o]ld California
cases" prohibited "exploratory" searches of trash left for collection, but
immediately reassures officers that the 1982 initiative makes any
"evidence seized in compliance with federal law ... admissible in court,
even if there was a violation of California law." Elsewhere the
Sourcebook points out that "[a]s a practical matter ... no [search or
seizure] case has discussed any 'independent state grounds' for many
years," and suggests that "the differences which once existed between
'federal law' and 'California law' have for the most part faded into
history."
It would be a mistake to make too much of the single example of
garbage searches in California, just as it would be a mistake to make too
much of the enormous difference of scale between suppression hearings
and civil damage actions for police illegality. But both pieces of
evidence point to a conclusion consistent with other available evidence.
Despite the genuinely vast changes in law enforcement over the past
forty years, the exclusionary rule probably still does a lot of work that no
other remedy stands ready to duplicate.' 57
Some state courts that reject the federal analysis have failed to "articulate a
coherent rationale" for the state-based exclusionary rule.158 Thus, for example,
some state courts simply view the balancing of interests or the possibility of
deterrence differently than the United States Supreme Court.159 Looking broadly
at the state trends, there is little new analysis. As with the high Court, the various
opinions fall on one side or the other of the proposition that the rule is
constitutionally based, and then recycle what has been repeated for decades to
support that conclusion. However, the analysis of some courts that have grounded
exclusion on a constitutional basis reinforces my contention that it is the only
sound basis for the rule.160
1 David Alan Sklansky, Is The Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567,
580-81 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
15s Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and Incompletely Theorized State Constitution Decision-
Making, 77 Miss. L.J. 265,299 (2007).
'9 E.g., State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 63-64 (Conn. 1990). Prior to Mapp, Connecticut did
not have an exclusionary rule; the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted one in 1988. State v.
Dukes, 547 A.2d 10 (Conn. 1988).
' For an insightful and biting criticism of the Utah Supreme Court's adoption of an
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Iowa was one of the first states to adopt the exclusionary rule, predating
Weeks by several years.'si The rule was viewed "as an integral part" of the state
constitution; however, in 1923, the Iowa Supreme Court "discarded" it and "Iowa
did not again have a state exclusionary rule until compelled to do so by" Mapp.162
In light of the adoption of the good faith exception in Leon, the Iowa Supreme
Court was asked to adopt that exception as a matter of Iowa constitutional law. It
declined to do so in a detailed decision embracing the exclusionary rule as
constitutionally based. The court saw the rule as serving a "purpose greater than
simply deterring police misconduct."l 63 The rule was viewed as a remedy for a
constitutional violation:
It is true ... that suppression of the evidence does not "cure" the
constitutional invasion, but it is clearly the best remedy available. As
with many civil remedies, the exclusionary rule merely places the parties
in the positions they would have been in had the unconstitutional search
not occurred, and the State is deprived only of that to which it was not
entitled in the first place.
It added: "There is simply no meaningful remedy available to one who has
suffered an illegal search other than prohibiting the State from benefitting from its
constitutional violation."' 65  The Iowa court also saw the rule as protecting the
integrity of the courts: "By admitting evidence obtained illegally, courts would in
essence condone the illegality by stating it does not matter how the evidence was
secured.... Judges would become accomplices to the unconstitutional conduct of
the executive branch if they allowed law enforcement to enjoy the benefits of the
exclusionary rule on independent state grounds that were not based on the Utah constitution, see Paul
G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules under State
Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 751. As Professor Cassell noted:
The opinion [in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)] suggested that Utah's
exclusionary rule may rest on-other-than constitutional footing. In a commendable effort
to limit the reach of the opinion, the plurality explained: "We therefore say nothing about
the nature of the exclusionary rule (constitutional requirement versus judicial remedy)
pursuant to article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. We simply hold that it exists."
If the plurality opinion had simply held that the exclusionary rule was a "constitutional
requirement" based on an interpretation of the Utah Constitution, one could at least
understand the basis for the plurality's holding. But reserving the constitutional issue
raises questions about the opinion's soundness.
Id. at 826-27. That lack of clear reasoning remains a part of Utah jurisprudence. Cf State v. Walker,
267 P.3d 210, 216-27 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring) (rejecting view that there is an exclusionary
rule under the Utah constitution).
161 State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 284-85 (Iowa 2000).
162 Id. at 285-87.
113 Id. at 289.
' Id. (citation omitted).
16s Id. at 291.
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illegality."16 6 Summing up, the court opined:
One of the fundamental guarantees of the Iowa Constitution is the
protection of its citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. We
believe that the only effective way to ensure that this right is more than
mere words on paper is to exclude illegally obtained evidence. The
reasonableness of a police officer's belief that the illegal search is lawful
does not lessen the constitutional violation. ... This court will simply
not "condone and approve a clear and known violation of a fundamental
constitutional right in order to sustain a conviction that we think correct."
To do so would elevate the goals of law enforcement above our citizens'
constitutional rights, a result not supported by any principle of
constitutional law.167
Other courts have employed similar reasoning, grounding the rule on
independent state constitutional grounds.'68  In a strongly worded opinion, the
Delaware Supreme Court traced the long history of grounding the exclusionary
rule on the Delaware constitution, emphasizing repeatedly the theme that rights
require remedies and that the exclusionary rule "is the constitutional remedy for a
violation of the search and seizure protections" set forth in the Delaware
Constitution.' 69
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Idaho chose to reject the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule and took the occasion to discuss its view that "the rule [is]
a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and seizures."' 70  It
summarized its reasoning as follows:
[T]he United States Supreme Court has abandoned the original purposes
of the exclusionary rule as announced in Weeks and adopted by this
Court in [State v. Arregui, 254 P.2d 788 (Idaho 1927)], in that the federal
system has clearly repudiated any purpose behind the exclusionary rule
other than that of a deterrent to illegal police behavior. Thus, the change
in federal law has provided an impetus for a return by this Court to
exclusive state analysis. We believe that the exclusionary rule should be
applied in order to: 1) provide an effective remedy to persons who have
been subjected to an unreasonable government search and/or seizure; 2)
deter the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3)
encourage thoroughness in the warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having
the judiciary commit an additional constitutional violation by considering
66 Id. at 289-90.
161 Id. at 292-93 (citation and footnote omitted).
168 E.g., State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992).
169 Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 821 (Del. 2000).
170 State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671 (Idaho 1992).
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evidence which has been obtained through illegal means; and 5) preserve
judicial integrity. We see no reason to depart from the exclusionary
rationale set out in Weeks and Arregui and their progeny, not
withstanding the United States Supreme Court's recent begrudging
approach towards fourth amendment protection.
Additionally, we disagree with the basic premise of the Leon
decision-that the decision whether to apply the exclusionary rule should
be made by determining whether the goal of police deterrence would be
furthered in the case at bar-because it totally fails to take into account
the other purposes of our independent state exclusionary rule. We
believe, regardless of whether the goal of police deterrence would be
served, that the other purposes of the state exclusionary rule justify
application of the rule in every case where evidence is seized pursuant to
a warrant which is not supported by a showing of probable cause.' 7'
The Idaho court noted that its "concern goes much further" than rejection of
the good faith rule announced in Leon; instead, it was the cost-benefit underlying
the high Court's analysis that the Idaho court viewed as flawed:
All of the rules which limit the admission of relevant evidence, including
the exclusionary rule, exist to protect values which are difficult to
quantify, yet which are considered important by society.
[T]he Vermont high court has written that the Leon cost-benefit analysis is of
no value because the costs and benefits involved cannot be accurately gauged:
The ultimate criticism of the Court's cost-benefit analysis in Leon is that
it is attempting to do what at this time cannot be done. There simply are
insufficient empirical data for the costs and benefits of a good faith
exception to be accurately assessed. The benefits of the exclusionary
rule are hard to measure because they consist of "non-events." "Police
compliance with the exclusionary rule produces a non-event which is not
directly observable-it consists of not conducting an illegal search."
[E]mpirical pronouncements without empirical support are not
persuasive.172
171 Id. at 672.
172 Id. at 673 (citation omitted). The court added that, even if it were to adopt a cost-benefit
test, it viewed the factors differently than the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 674-78.
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VI. EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF A CONSTITUTIONALLY-BASED RULE
Re-constitutionalizing the exclusionary rule, although clearly expanding the
application of the remedy, would not eliminate all exceptions to it.'7 3 I do not
attempt here to set forth a comprehensive list of exceptions but note, instead, that
the rule has never been perceived to be an absolute bar to the admission of
evidence. A significant limitation on the application of the exclusionary rule is the
independent source doctrine, which permits the introduction of evidence that is not
causally related to the Fourth Amendment violation. This doctrine has a long
pedigree, with roots in case law at a time when the exclusionary rule was
considered constitutionally based.174 This view has been repeated and developed
in later decisions.175 Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence that has
been wrongfully seized is not suppressed if it would have been inevitably
discovered by the police pursuing a lawful course of conduct.176 Also in the era
preceding the deconstitutionalization of the rule and the primacy of deterrence
theory, the Court in Wong Sun v. United States'77 created and applied the classic
formulation of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to determine whether drugs
and statements should be excluded in a federal prosecution.
VII. CONCLUSION
From Wolf through the present, shifting majorities have debated the
exclusionary rule. There appears to be no tie-breaker in the debate nor time limit
on it. As discussed, beginning at least with Weeks in 1914, and ending with
Calandra in 1974, the rule was generally thought to be constitutionally based. As
early as 1949, Justice Rutledge said it was too late to question that basis. Since
1974, the Court has taken the opposing view and, although there are no prospects
that the Court in the near future will change its view again, what may prove as
equally false as Justice Rutledge's observations are the ready assurances that the
rule is not constitutionally mandated.
The debate concerning the exclusionary rule has often coincided with
discussions of the availability and adequacy-or even the exclusivity-of other
1 The State of Washington has the most unique search and seizure jurisprudence of all the
states. Its exclusionary rule is "nearly categorical" and constitutionally grounded. State v. Eserjose,
259 P.3d 172, 176 (Wash. 2011). Yet, even Washington recognizes a variety of exceptions to
exclusion, such as independent source and attenuation. Id. at 176-84.
174 Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
17s E.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
486, 491 (1963).
176 See, e.g., Nix, 467 U.S. at 446-48. The inevitable discovery doctrine "is in reality an
extrapolation from the independent source doctrine; [because] the tainted evidence would be
admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably
would have been discovered." Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988).
177 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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remedies. My essential point is, however, that the availability of other remedies is
beside the point if the rule is viewed as part of the constitutional right. There can
be no greater authority to support that essential insight than Marbury v. Madison:
If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of this
country afford him a remedy? The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of
government is to afford that protection. The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws
fumish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. 7 8
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, implying a right to sue for damages for a Fourth
Amendment violation, the Court relied on Marbury, stating:
The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can demonstrate an
injury consequent upon the violation by federal agents of his Fourth
Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his injury through a particular
remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts. "The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."1 79
The essential association of a remedy with the right is no less true when the
government violates the Fourth Amendment and obtains evidence it seeks to use in
a criminal case against the accused. For me, that ends the inquiry: in a criminal
case, the only available remedy is exclusion.
Supporting my belief in the constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule are
the consequences of the "deterrence" or "culpability" approach when the rule is
viewed as non-constitutionally based. The Court has no authority to impose such a
rule on the states. There is no coherent basis for its application and the ever
evolving rationales appear to be nothing more than shallow attempts to justify
subjective assessments of the value of the rule. We have been here before, with
the short-lived Rochin shocks the conscience standard that could not "shape the
conduct of local police one whit" and served at best to result in "unpredictable
... 5 U.S. 137, 162-63 (1803) (paragraph breaks omitted). If even older authority is needed,
an essayist in 1765 wrote that general warrants should be condemned in all cases as illegal. He
maintained: "In short, if this was not the constitution, I think, 'we might amuse the public with the
sound of liberty, but should enjoy none." FATHER OF CANDOR, LETTER CONCERNING LIBELS,
WARRANTS, THE SEIZURE OF PAPERS 50 (5th ed. 1765). He also maintained that damages as a
possible remedy had nothing to do with condemning such warrants as "an infringement of the
constitution." Id. at 66.
"7 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (citations omitted).
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reversals." 80  Perhaps most alarming to me is the prospect of erosion of
understanding of what the Fourth Amendment protects, the steady drumbeat of
minor violations, leading to less and less respect for individual rights.
Compounding that concern is the muddying of the distinction between the
violation of a person's right and whether the police should have qualified
immunity (in civil cases) or whether the police actions are sufficiently culpable (in
criminal cases). 8 '
It is the nature of pendulums to swing from one side of center to the other
once in motion. Short of outright abolition of the rule, the pendulum has swung as
far as it can in favor of admitting evidence found to be in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The trends in some of the state courts are in the opposite direction,
moving toward the view that the exclusionary rule is grounded in a personal right.
Perhaps a future generation of Justices, like those who took notice of the trends in
Wolf Mapp, and Elkins, will be influenced by the views of the states. Perhaps
then, at least for a time, the rule will be recognized as a right of the individual, to
insure that his or her right to be secure is indeed secure.
180 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring).
181 The warning of Boyd rings true to me: "It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto
should be obsta principiis" ["withstand beginnings"]. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635
(1886). Similar cautions have been made throughout history. See FATHER OF CANDOR, LETTER
CONCERNING LIBELS, WARRANTS, THE SEIZURE OF PAPERS 51 (5th ed. 1765) ("Every thing of this sort
is practiced with some tenderness at first. Tyranny grows by degrees.").
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